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I. Introduction 
 
Since 1950, the demand for water has more than doubled in the United States. 
Historically, growing demands have been met by increasing reservoir capacity and 
groundwater mining, often at the expense of environmental and cultural concerns. The 
future is expected to hold much of the same. Demand for water will continue to increase, 
particularly in response to the expanding urban sector, while growing concerns about the 
environment are prompting interest in allocating more water for in-stream uses, and 
cultural issues will remain at the fore. So, where will this water come from? Virtually all 
water supplies are allocated. Providing for new users requires a reduction in the amount 
of water dedicated to existing users and a mechanism for transferring water between 
users.  
 
Markets typically are formed to facilitate the efficient allocation of goods and services.  
Under simple conditions buyers and sellers pursuing their own self-interest willingly 
agree upon a single price that fully compensates sellers and provides the commodity to 
those who value it highest6.  The general concept of water marketing (here taken to mean 
a permanent transfer of a water right) and water leasing/banking (a temporary transfer) 
has gained considerable attention as a volunteer, market-mediated system for transferring 
water between competing uses.   
 
A sampling of investigations into water marketing where the focus in upon the formal 
trading of rights (as against leasing) can be found in Howe et al (1986), Burness and 
Quirk (1980), Simpson (1994), Saliba (1987), Easter (1999), Easter et al (1999), Colby 
(1993), Colby (2000), Howe and Goemans (2003) and Brookshire et al (2005). Often 
water marketing is viewed as movement from agricultural use to urban uses, which are 
typically viewed as permanent.   
 
Formal market transfers are also often slow, and do not necessarily increase the flexibility 
of water users to trade quickly in response to near terms shortages and thus they do not 
directly address the need for a trading mechanism that can rapidly respond to climatic 
induced needs.   
                                                 
1 This material is based upon work supported by SAHRA (Sustainability of semi-Arid Hydrology and 
Riparian Areas) under the STC Program of the National Science Foundation, Agreement No. EAR-
9876800 
2 Professor of Economics, university of New Mexico, Albuquerque New Mexico 
3 Professor of Economics, Harris School of Public Policy, university of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 
4 Geohydrology Department, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico 
5 Graduate Assistant, Department of Economics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 
6 It cannot be emphasized enough that any transfer of water within a market-based system is a voluntary 
transfer. 
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Water Banking/leasing approaches have been set forth as one possibility for addressing 
the increasing needs and the possibility of reallocation within and across current uses, in 
a timely fashion. The Water 2025: Preventing Crises and Conflict in the West (2005) 
calls for consideration of market-based principles in the context of existing institutional 
structures7.  The New Mexico State Water plan also calls for an efficient water transfer 
plan (Office of the State Engineer (2003)). The New Mexico plan specifically supports 
water transfers as a strategic management tool for efficient water transfers inclusive of 
water banks8. Specifically, the State Engineer is responsible for implementation and 
encourages the creations of water banks in areas that are experiencing shortages.  
 
A recent report details the limited nature of water leasing/banking in the Western U.S. 
(West Water Research (2004)). The report provides an analysis of water banking 
legislation policies and programs in 12 Western states. There are 23 active water banks of 
which seven are market based pricing, meaning that the price is negotiated between the 
buyer and the seller with one bank having online negotiations. The other 16 banks are 
fixed pricing or administrative pricing schemes that are set annually.  Length of 
transaction varies and the number of transactions is limited annually.   
  
Here we explore the role of water leasing/banking in allocating resources among 
competing demands. In particular, we develop a stylized template for temporary 
voluntary transfers amongst competing uses (agriculture, Native American farming, 
environmental interests, urban interests) on the Middle Rio Grande.  There are many 
issues (engineering, physical, legal, and institutional) to be addressed in allowing for 
water transfers within a basin. Central to our effort is linking of a 
hydrological/engineering/institutional model that allows for water transfers to be 
evaluated within the various frameworks.   
 
II. Objectives 
 
In our initial framework, we represent one physical component by tracking evaporation 
associated with trades up and down the river.  Our stylized template allows for future 
exploration of different physical, hydrological, engineering, spatial resolutions, market 
systems, legal institutions and priority frameworks, option trading through time, various 
representations of uncertainty, and different frameworks for third-party effects. The 
model design allows behavioral experiments to be conducted with subjects from key 
water use sectors to test how a voluntary water banking/leasing exchange process might 
operate.  
 
                                                 
7 The 2025 report sets forth some guiding principles for water transfers.  These include in part, that 
recognition and respect must be made for state, tribal, and federal water rights, contracts, and interstate 
compacts or decrees of the United States Supreme Court that allocate the right to use water, that methods 
should include efforts to enhance water conservation, use efficiency and resource monitoring to allow 
existing water supplies to be used more effectively and that collaborative approaches go hand in hand with 
market based transfers in order to minimize conflicts.   
8 The New Mexico plan state: “Consider water rights transfer policies that balance the need to protect the 
customs, culture, environment and economics health and stability of the states diverse communities while 
providing for timely and efficient transfers of water between uses to meet both short-term shortages and 
long-term economic development needs.” 
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III. Approach 
 
The model addresses the Middle 
Rio Grande basin in New 
Mexico, which is bounded by 
Cochiti Reservoir to the north and 
Elephant Butte Reservoir to the 
south. The model (Figure 1) 
integrates a physical/engineering 
model (e.g., climate, surface 
water, groundwater and riparian 
habitat) with a 
behavioral/economic model (e.g., 
lease trading system, water 
demand). The model allows a 
series of players representing  
Agricultural/Native American 
farming, municipalities and 
environmental interests to trade water under high, average, and low water supply years. 
The model yields price paths for the exchanges and tracks water movements by users and 
by reach.  
      
IV. Physical Setting 
 
The Middle Rio Grande of central New Mexico (Figure 2) is characterized by basin and 
range topography with mountains along the east, and arid valleys and mesas to the central 
and west. The principle drainage for the basin is the Rio Grande, which is the primary 
source of irrigation water for the region’s farmers. 
Municipal demands are met though pumping of deep 
alluvial aquifers that are directly connected with the 
Rio Grande River. Vegetation classes found within the 
region range from riparian along the Rio Grande to 
desert grassland, pinyon-juniper woodlands and mixed 
coniferous forest at higher mountain elevations. The 
planning region includes Albuquerque, the principal 
urban center of New Mexico, and several smaller 
communities including Rio Rancho, Belen, Los Lunas, 
Socorro and Bernalillo.  These communities are 
located along the Rio Grande, while sparse rural 
populations characterizing the outlying areas. From 
1900 to 2000 the population of this region grew from 
about 51,000 to about 713,000 (a 1298% increase), 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The most recent doubling of population occurred 
from about 1970 to 2000.  
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Figure 1. Schematic of integrated model architecture and 
feedback structure. 
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V. System Dynamics  
 
The water leasing/banking model is formulated within a system dynamics context. 
System dynamics provides a unique mathematical framework for integrating the natural 
and social processes important to 
managing natural resources, while 
providing an interactive interface for 
engaging the public in the decision 
process. System dynamics is formulated 
on a spatially aggregated, temporally 
dynamic basis (i.e., lumped parameter 
model). Simply put, these models track 
the temporal trends in key system 
commodities (e.g., surface/groundwater) 
resulting from variable inflows and 
outflows (see Figure 3). These “flows” 
are modeled by way of historic data, 
empirical relations, analytical models, or from the output of spatially disaggregated 
models. Stocks and flows rarely operate independently but rather in a system of feedback 
and time delays.  
 
VI. Physical Model Structure 
 
The physical/engineering model is developed within the commercial system dynamics 
software package, Powersim Studio 2003. The model is designed to operate on a yearly 
time step. The model is structured according to 6 interacting reaches, as delineated by the 
major gages on the Rio Grande.  Rio Grande inflows, tributary inflows and climatic 
conditions taken from 
historical records define the 
external forcing applied to 
the model.  In this way, 
simulations can be run for 
dry, average, or wet years 
with either high or low 
reservoir storage. The 
model then calculates the 
basic water balance 
components for each reach 
of the model.   The basic 
water balance terms are 
given in Figure 4.  These 
terms are calculated by way 
of empirical models, 
analytical models, or through mass balance calculations. For each time step, two model 
runs are performed. During the first run the model calculates river flows, conveyance 
losses, and available irrigation water.  This information is supplied to the 
leasing/behavioral model.  When a trading period ends, the water balance is re-calculated 
Figure 3. Schematic of simple system dynamics stock 
and flow diagram. 
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Figure 4. Schematic of generic reach showing the key water budget 
terms calculated by the hydrologic/engineering model. 
 5 5 
with the physical/engineering model. The second run of the model then calculates 
impacts of the trades on the hydraulic system. 
 
VII. Market/Behavioral Model: Water Leasing/Banking Exchange Design 
 
We utilize an open market trading system similar to the system used to trade other 
commodities such as wheat, corn, pork bellies and metals. Specifically, we employ a 
system known as a double oral auction. Buyers and sellers declare their bids and offers to 
the market. Contracts are established when a buyer and a seller agree on a standing price. 
The market is open for a fixed amount of time. Time in the experiment consists of a 
series of years, during which the market for water occurs during the six months of the 
growing season.  There are four classes of participants in a leasing experiment. The 
participants (subjects in the experiments) represent the interests of specific users, 
including agricultural, Native Americans, urban interests, and environmental interests. 
Each agent represents the interests of one of these four user groups in a single reach of 
the model. Trades are allowed 
between reaches and within 
reaches.  Subjects are motivated by 
monetary reward in the 
experiments and are paid based on 
profits earned through the leasing 
of water or by obtaining their 
yearly payoff based on their water 
use. We are not conducting 
simulations rather we are assuming 
the participants in the experiments 
maximize profits based on their underlying payoff functions.  The experiment is based on 
the engineering model with a stylized river.  The river flows from reach 1 to reach 6 
(Figure 5).  Using Powersim Studio 2003 water reduction factors are calculated for the 
four different classes of experiments. 
 
VIII. Utility Functions 
 
Each water user group is motivated by a utility function unique to their needs.  
Agricultural/Native American users require three acre-feet of water during the growing 
season for their crops.  Failure to obtain this minimum amount of water results in 
complete failure of their crop for the season.  Excess amounts do not increase the crop 
payoffs but can be leased out for monetary gain.  Players have the option of leasing their 
water instead of growing a crop, or if they are unable to obtain sufficient quantities of 
water for a crop.  The urban region within the model represents Albuquerque. For this 
user, it is assumed that water produces value in ever increasing amounts but is subject to 
the law of diminishing marginal utility. For this reason, we model the urban payoff to 
water using a quadratic specification.  Environmental uses of water are assumed to be for 
minnow protection and riparian restoration. These demands are modeled by a set of 
preferences that depend upon maintaining a minimum of two acre-feet of water in the 
river. Below this minimum, environmental losses occur. Above the minimum, positive 
Environmental outcomes are forthcoming.   
 
Figure 5.  Depiction of stylized river
 6 6 
Figure 6 shows the demand functions for the three user groups.  The demand functions 
for agricultural/Native American farming and environmental interests are a step demand 
function while the urban user has a downward sloping demand curve.   
Agricultural/Native American users seeking to maximize monetary payout will be willing 
to pay up to (b/a) to obtain (a) units of water.  The Environmental user’s demand function 
is also a step function.  The environmental user is willing to pay up to (c/b) to obtain (b) 
units of water.  However, the environmental user receives a negative payoff if they allow 
water in the river to drop below a threshold of (b) units.  This effectively models 
environmental concerns such as silvery minnow protection in the Middle Rio Grande.  
The urban user faces a downward sloping demand curve to model the idea of diminishing 
marginal returns.   
 
Multiplying the agricultural/Native American demand function by the number of players 
(n), environmental by the number of players (n) and the Urban by the number of players 
(n), then summing creates a market demand curve, the diagram on the far right of Figure 
6. Using the experimentally set market supply and the market demand that comes from 
the aggregation of the three demand functions, an equilibrium or efficiency price can be 
calculated as the intersection of the market supply and the market demand.  This allows 
the observed experimental prices to be compared to the efficiency price in order to 
determine if the market is efficient.   
 
Three different climatic scenarios are also represented in Figure 6 with red (Q1) 
representing a dry climatic scenario, black (Q2) representing a normal climatic scenario 
and blue (Q3) representing a wet climatic scenario.  The different climatic scenarios are 
the market supply of water, with the intersection of the aggregate demand curve being the 
efficiency price for the market. 
  
IX. Experiments 
 
The market experiments are conducted through a series of bidding sessions. In these 
sessions information from the physical/engineering model is passed to participants via a 
web interface. Water users may enter bid quantities and prices to sell or buy a unit of 
water, or they may accept specific offers at one-unit increments. The web interface 
checks to make sure both the buyer and seller each have sufficient amounts of money and 
water, and then determines if the transfer is possible using loss estimates from the 
Figure 6.  The three different water user groups are summed to create a market demand in order to 
develop the efficiency price.  Q1 represents a dry water scenario,  Q2 a normal water scenario and  
Q3 a wet water scenario. 
Agricultural/Native 
American  
Environmental Urban Market Demand
1     2           3 
Deleted: Red
Deleted: black
Deleted: blue
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physical/engineering model. Other potential constraints on a trade include water 
availability, Rio Grande Compact compliance, and/or Minimum River flow requirements.  
When a trade is made, the accepted bid or offer disappears from the bid/offer sheet. 
Buyers and sellers are free to update their bids and offers throughout the duration of the 
trading year. At the end of the year, the compact balance is checked and the hydrological 
model is recalibrated based upon the contracts impact on water flows.  Bidding is 
concluded when all bidders have bought or sold as needed, some set number of transfers 
have been refused, or a fixed time limit is exceeded.  All trades are voluntary.  
 
X. Results 
 
Fourteen experiments were 
conducted over the summer 
of 2005; 3 decreasing 
scenarios, 3 increasing 
scenarios, 3 dry scenarios, 
3 normal scenarios, 1 above 
normal scenario and 1 
below normal scenario.  
Scenarios were developed 
by coupling the physical 
(hydrological) model with 
the engineering model.  
The water reduction factors 
for the experiments are 
shown in Figure 7.  For example, in the decreasing water scenario the Agricultural/Native 
American user begins trading year 1 with 3.75 acre feet of water which is above the 3 
acre feet required to grow a crop 
for the trading year.  Over the 
course of the trading years, water 
becomes scarce.  In year 10 the 
user begins the trading year with 
1.45 acre-feet of water.  The 
water reduction factor was used 
to calculate the allocation for 
each user.  Results show that the 
weighted average price obtained 
in the experiment is above the 
efficiency price calculated from 
the demand functions (Figure 8).   
The model also proved to be 
robust as all users engaged in 
multiple trades during each 
trading year.   
 
Trading of water was observed both between reaches and within reaches.  The current 
model only has one representative per user type on a reach (i.e. only one environmental 
user per reach).  Even with a single representative, the results have shown that trading 
Water Reduction for Different Treatments
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Water 
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Figure 7.  Four different climatic scenarios
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Figure 10.  Agricultural/Native Americans percentage of 
initial allocation
occurs amongst the user groups 
and within the user groups.   
Figure 9 shows how water was 
traded for the 
Agricultural/Native American 
user during one decreasing 
water scenario (experiment 1).  
As can be seen, most of the 
trading occurs between the user 
group itself, with very few 
trades occurring with the urban 
user.  As water became scarce, 
the number of trades engaged 
in by the Agricultural/Native 
American group declined.  
Figure 10 shows that although 
the number of trades declined 
for this user group the amount of water traded increased as water became scarce.  Results 
show that Agricultural/Native American users leased water in dry years to obtain 
monetary benefits rather than grow a crop.  The initial allocation of water for this user 
group is the point zero in Figure 10. The negative percentage means that farmers are net 
sellers of water.   
 
Environmental users 
benefited the most in a 
decreasing water scenario, as 
they became net purchasers 
of water.  The market system 
is able to meet environmental 
concerns such as protecting 
the silvery minnow and 
farmers were able to make a 
positive monetary reward by 
selling water to these users.  
The model is also able to 
track water movement 
between reaches and user 
groups.  A priori expectations 
are that water would be traded upstream due to the effect of evaporation.  Thus, water 
that would have been lost to evaporation can be saved through the trading of water from 
the lower reaches to the upper reaches.  Results from the experiments have shown this to 
be true.   
 
Figure 11 is a representation of the stylized river before a trading year (left side) and after 
a trading year (right side).  The result shows the 7th round of a decreasing water scenario.  
To determine water movement by reach it was necessary to aggregate total water in each 
reach.  Summing each user’s water allotment by each reach did this.  Since the 
Environmental user’s initial water allotment is below the minimum flow requirement 
Who Agricultural/Nativ e American sells water 
to
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Figure 9.  Agricultural/Native American trading of water 
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needed to protect riparian interest and the silvery minnow, they purchase water since they 
are facing a monetary punishment if they allow the 
river to fall below this threshold.  This explains why 
the results show a positive gain in the lower reaches 
of the river in figure 11, as there is only an 
Agricultural and Environmental user in reaches 4 and 
5 with only an Environmental user in reach 6.  The 
Environmental users in the lower reaches are 
purchasers of water because of the demand functions 
they face as shown in figure 6.   
 
Not only were these outcomes realized from the 
experiment, it was also observed that participants are 
able to handle the cognitive complexity of trading in 
a complex water market subject to exogenous 
hydrological forces.  Multiple trading was observed 
in each experiment run showing that participants 
comprehend the cognitive complexity of the model 
and that the model is robust.   
 
XI. Extensions 
 
This model is merely a starting point, where any 
possibly climatic scenario and its affect upon 
behavior can be modeled.  Further research to be 
conducted will have real farmers play the role of the 
agricultural agent, along with Native Americans, 
Environmentalists, and Urban consumers playing their respective role.  This will allow 
for water and its role in the culture of acequias to be more accurately modeled and 
included in later experiments.  Currently third party effects are not included in the model; 
including such effects will introduce solution concepts for these situations.  The current 
economic model is a double oral auction; other models will be examined as a way of 
conducting trades.  Examination of intertemporal trading-both within years and between 
years will be incorporated into the model.  The inclusion of transaction costs, modeling 
laterals, and the use of a central planner in the model will also be explored as extensions 
or variations to the current economic model. 
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